This paper offers an alternative reading of the Abbé Sieyès and the modern 'nationstate' problématique. I argue that the subject/object that is constituted in the early days of modernity is the incomplete society: an impossible-possibility ideal of congruency of population, authority and space. I suggest reading this ideal of congruency as a fantasy in that it offers a certain 'fullness to come', the promise of jouissance that can never be attained and is thus constantly re-envisioned and reinvoked. Drawing on discourse-analytical and psychoanalytical tools I explain the logic of fantasy before analysing Sieyès' What is the Third Estate?, as I show how he critiques and fragments the old model of the state and how his reading of the nation is fantasmatic, a continuous project towards impossible congruency.
Introduction
Critiques of modernity have pointed to late eighteenth century Europe and specifically the French Revolution and the writings of the Abbé Sieyès as the modern birth-place of the 'nation-state' problématique.
1 That is, the problematic emergence of the principle of congruency of nation and state sovereignty. As Robert Wokler puts it:
'the modern state since the French Revolution requires that the represented -that is, the people as a whole -be a moral person as well, national unity going hand in hand with the political unity of the state'. 2 To the anthropologist Ernest Gellner the principle of congruency is at the heart of modern nationalism as '[n]ationalist sentiments are deeply offended by violations of the nationalist principle of congruence of state and nation', for '[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent'. 3 This ideal of congruency is still pervasive in our contemporary discourses, practices and policies at both domestic and international levels. In mainstream political science and international relations the lack of congruency is the root cause of conflict, affecting the stability and territorial integrity of polities world-wide.
Security, stability and good governance are thus the result of a unity or even a fusion of national sentiments with territorial-sovereign demarcations such that the warproneness of regions like the Middle-East is attributed to their lack of congruency, or what some defined as a 'state-to-nation imbalance'. 4 Practicing congruency is, nonetheless, much more subtle and 'banal' than the above examples of war and/or the territorial disintegration of states, nor is the principle of congruency to be solely associated with expressions of chauvinistnationalism or the atrocities of mass killings -it is not simply 'pathological homogenisation' practices '... that state-builders have employed to signify the unity of 2 their state and the legitimacy of their authority'. 5 Consider the scholarship on multiculturalism, communitarianism and liberal nationalism in which the exclusionary practices of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia are rejected but the ideal of congruency is nonetheless key. 6 Nationalism and a sense of communitarian unity are not contradictory to the principles of liberalism but rather commensurable and complementary as the goal of multiculturalism is '… not to balkanize the nation, but rather to find a new modus vivendi for achieving national unity', 7 a model of societal 'unity in diversity'. 8 Establishing congruency through non-ethnic/sectarian models of societal unity is quite pervasive in the scholarship on nations and nationalism, theories of the state as well as literature on post-conflict societies. Some have suggested that congruency has been established historically in polities where strong functioning state control was ascertained before the advent of modern national fervour, that is, where the state preceded the nation, as it were. 9 To others this was defined as a 'state-nation' model, which may also be applied to post-conflict societies en route to democratization, whereas some have further developed and elaborated the models of civic-nationalism and patriotism as opposed to the exclusionary models of ethnic-based nationalism. 10 This paper takes a Nietzschean (1988 [1887] ) perspective and thus a genealogical approach and asks 'how did we get here?' 11 Within the framework of European/'Western' thought, under which conditions have we come to define our socio-political existence, problems and solutions in terms of unity and congruency?
Under which conditions has the principle of congruency, however defined, come to be rendered intelligible and legitimate even in modalities that seek to break-away from the exclusionary vocabulary of (ethno-) nationalism? 12 Rather, the 'nation-state' model refers to the fantasy of the 'congruent society'. This is a society that from the late eighteenth century knows and evaluates its identity through the fantasy of congruency between population, authority and space, broadly defined.
What Sieyès does, I argue, is neither to fuse the nation with the state (through the language of popular sovereignty and constituent power), nor is Sieyès' discourse '… a continuation of the Hobbesian theory of indirect popular sovereignty. 13 Rather, what
Sieyès suggests is a complete disavowal of the state model of early-modernity, that is, a break-up, fragmentation and critique of the Hobbesian state of early-modernity as modality of congruency, and construct instead an impossible idea(l) of the congruent society, not of the 'nation-state' qua fusion of nation with state.
14 I further maintain that this ideal of congruency can be read as a fantasy, or a fantasmatic project, an endless endeavour of overcoming the lack and contingency of social life by offering a 'fullness-to-come'. 15 The idea of congruency is a fantasy for it masks the disunity of, and the split in, society by offering an explanation for why 'society' (the 'nation', the 'people' and other tropes referring to an imagined collectivity)
is not yet congruent and by promising resolution and thus unity '… once a named or implied obstacle is overcome'. 16 Since such a mode of wholeness, a fixed identity, is never possible congruency has constantly to be re-imagined and reinvigorated, a certain utopia that is never ascertained and hence continuously re-4 invoked. 17 In a way, this is the 'permanent crisis' of the 'nation-state' that Hont refers to when he offers a happy escape from death, which falls short of achieving a utopian return to real health. In such a scenario the patient stumbles from one relapse to the next, the 'crisis' always recurring, yet constantly changing in its precise nature and location. 18 Revisiting the conventional 'nation-state' discourse has important implications for our contemporary theories and models of socio-political life. Firstly, it allows us to examine the issue of congruency which is a leitmotif in modernity, but that is usually lost in the literature or at least made concomitant to sovereignty, territoriality and the 'state'. 19 Secondly, revisiting Sieyès' Third Estate may also contribute to the common focus on Sieyès' discourse as a theory of representation and the notion of the constituent power as I suggest that Sieyès' Third Estate does not only have a juridical function, but a fantasmatic one thus explaining how the concept of the nation is inherently split, seeking continuously to locate the Other, who/which hinders the congruency fantasy. 20 Thirdly, focusing on the fantasy of congruency and the ideal of the 'congruent society' exposes how various contemporary discourses that seek to escape from the vocabulary of the 'nation-state', statism and nationalism -e.g., communitarianism, multiculturalism, 'civic nationalism', consociationalismnonetheless subscribe to the ideal of congruency, a unity of population, authority and space. 21 The potential contribution of this paper thus rests in introducing a different lexicon for understanding modernity's preoccupation with the fantasy of congruency, however constructed, and thus to potentially change 'the way in which a situation is apprehended' and political intervention is rendered possible. early-modernity is not fused with the nation; rather, it is fragmented and critiqued and how from that moment on the subject that emerges is that of society, an ideal of collectivity desiring to achieve the impossible mode of congruity. Finally, I conclude by pointing to avenues for future research.
The Logic of Fantasy
We may begin discussing fantasy by elucidating Lacan's 'Mirror Stage', a key starting point to understanding Lacan's logic of fantasy. 25 The Mirror Stage, the 6 moment in a child's early development in which the child recognises him/herself in the mirror, is precisely the moment in which human subjectivity is rendered both meaningful and incomplete. The Mirror Stage is thus an alienating phase because what the child sees in the mirror is both more 'real' and less 'real' to what the child (and the adult person) can identify and identify with. 26 The 'imago' is more real because it captures the entirety of the subject's body, indeed as it is seen by others in the environment, an imago which the subject can perhaps imagine but not fully capture. One's own bodily entirety is not accessible to one's senses as it is to one's environment. But the 'imago' is also less real because it is not 'really' the subject's being. To begin with it has no materiality, nor depth as it is a mirage. It is less real also because it offers an inverted image of one's body, i.e. a 'mirror image'.
The 'imago' is thus an 'alienating identity' 27 as it both captures the whole of the subject's body, which the subject can never achieve, and at the same time it negates its core being, further distancing the ability for one to capture one's subjectivity. 28 The imago thus offers an 'Ideal-I, i.e. as an I that can never be realized'. 29 This is how and why the Mirror Stage helps us understand the logic of fantasy, a support of sorts for the incompleteness of social reality that is more real and less real to that of society, the nation, the state or any form of imaginary collectivity, and that precisely because of this must continuously aspire to capture its being/becoming in the world.
The imago of society is always in flux and ambivalent at its core, in the same manner that a child both identifies with and is alienated by his/her mirror image. Fantasy thus always attempts to frame the ideal society in which we wish to live; it sets the criteria by which the 'good life' can be attained. Fantasy constantly strives to cover the lack, the incompleteness and indeed void of and within society. As such, fantasy, or fantasmatic projects, constantly aspire 'to account for the unpredictability, indeed, the contingent nature of social life by providing an ideal and reassuring blueprint for a fixed and structured world', a certain necessary utopia, that is, the future promise of fulfilment in which fantasy is realised, although a realisation that can never be attained as I explain below. 31 Taylor's 'social imaginaries', nonetheless, only offers part of the story since fantasy is not merely a social imaginary, an ideal utopian world that aspires to transcend or negate reality and our troubled present. Quite the opposite, fantasy operates as the supporter of the present reality:
Are we than dealing here with the simple opposition between reality and its fantasy supplement? The topology is more complex: what precedes fantasy is not reality but a hole in reality, its point of impossibility filled in with fantasy (Žižek, 2008: xiv) . 32 Fantasy, therefore, should not be read as the antonym of 'reality'; rather, it is that which constructs and renders 'reality' possible -a reality that is contingent and in which society, the nation, 'we' is anything but a homogeneous symbolism. As Žižek puts it: '[f]antasy is the ultimate support of reality: "reality" stabilizes itself when some fantasy-frame of a "symbolic-bliss" forecloses the view into the abyss of the Real'. 33 This is because 'fantasy is basically a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impossibility, a screen masking a void'. 34 We could, therefore, read 'fantasy' as a socially constructed project that envisions a certain ideal, thus entailing a sense of fullness and completeness, but one that must incorporate its own failure, and this is again how the mirage of the child imago in the Mirror Stage is key to understanding how the logic of congruency is fantasmatic:
Fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off the radical contingency of social relations. It does this through a fantasmatic narrative or logic that promises a fullnessto-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome ... or which foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable. 35 Indeed, congruency fantasies either suppress and mask differences, or create an image of an harmonious whole whereby differences and divisions coexist in peace and in their diversity make the whole congruent since '... fantasy is precisely the way the antagonistic fissure is masked'.
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The modern fantasmatic project of (national/societal) congruency ushered by the Abbé Sieyès, as I show below, nonetheless, is not merely a discursive or structural filling whereby society, the nation, 'we' is constructed and filled with meaning. Rather, the fantasy of congruency becomes palpable through affect, that is, by invoking bodily jouissance, which refers to '… the powerful, bodily enjoyment that drives human desire'. 37 Bodily enjoyment that are 'always-already lost'. 38 Simply think about national myths and narratives, or what Duncan Bell calls 'mythscapes', which narrate the past as a one-dimensional, often self-aggrandisement, story by which identity is forged and legitimated, and through which prospective political programmes are rendered intelligible and often embroiled with eschatological elements. 39 This is where the heroic past and 'Golden Age' of nations and societies are invoked, not only to consolidate collective sentiment, but also to justify continuous and future struggles designed to fashion and perfect the imagined national/social monism. Such myths in order to sustain their affective coordinates project their present incompleteness onto an Other, the Jew in the Nazi/anti-Semitic worldview or the immigrant in contemporary populist European discourse. 40 This Other is not so much the 'remainder' of a sovereignty based international system; rather, this Other stands for difference as such and, consequently, is blamed for 'our' inability to achieve congruency, the fulfilment of the fantasmatic utopia, and for stealing 'our' enjoyment by taking our jobs and exploiting our welfare system, by marrying our daughters and destabilising our perceived cultural stability. 41 Fantasmatic projects, therefore, have an affective quality in the sense that they cover the lack and the split nation/society by promising future closure, but at the same time ensuring such realisation is never attained for such mode of congruency '…would kill desire, induce anxiety, and put identification processes in danger' thus creating a trauma/nightmare. 42 It is this that makes the imagined congruity of the nation/society such a powerful emotive ideal, a leitmotif that is never attained and thus continuously reinvigorated and re-articulated, precisely because any attempt at satisfying the lack (of unity) in the nation/society will reveal the split itself, the void behind the fantasmatic mask of closure, fullness and congruency.
Bells' 'mythscape', therefore, is not only part of a nation's 'invented tradition', its 'imagined community' narrative or '... the particularity or specificity of its world of significations' by which it is rendered real. 43 What national and social myths demonstrate is actually the continuous attempt to recapture the lost enjoyment, to establish the authentic community by getting rid of the obstacle, the Other, who stands for the blocked identity. 44 This is precisely the added-value of the analytical category of fantasy and how it can assist us in re-reading the 'nation-state' problématique, namely in that fantasy is not merely a tool designed to show how national/societal identities are forged or how they are imagined and/or socially constructed; rather, the fantasy of congruency demonstrates the negation inherent in any 'mythscape' and/or 'social imaginary' since fantasies of congruency always incorporate their own impossibility, the inability to recoup their lost golden age or to fully achieve the utopian mode of unity and fulfilment. 45 This is because what comes before or lies underneath fantasy is not reality, but a lack of any meaningful sense of being. Equally important, the category of fantasy allows us to interrogate the libidinal investment in national/societal congruency projects, that is, the ways in which congruency fantasies are able to hail people through bodily affect and an appeal to recapture the always-already lost enjoyment.
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The point here is not to extrapolate from the human unit to the social one as if the social unit is merely an aggregate of persons. My deployment of Lacan's Mirror
Stage and the logic of fantasy is strategic and analytical thus enabling me to understand the affective power of fantasmatic projects, indeed how (certain) fantasies are able to interpellate people and emotively mobilise society, whilst creating a sense of identification, an identification which is ambiguous and incomplete at its core.
ABBÉ SIEYÈS AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE STATE AS MODALITY OF CONGRUENCY
The Abbé Sieyès' discourse is often mentioned as the birth of the 'nation-state', a political order based on popular sovereignty and '… the fusion of state and nation'. 47 This reading is somewhat problematic because in Sieyès' formula the state of earlymodernity is not fused with the novel notion of the nation, the Third Estate; rather, the 52 , which should be freed to govern itself, and that other privileged orders have no place in its midst. The Third Estate, the nation, is thus the main discursive field since it '... encompasses everything pertaining to the Nation, and everyone outside the Third Estate cannot be considered to be a member of the Nation.
What is the Third Estate? EVERYTHING'. 53 The idea of the Third Estate as the nation represents in Sieyès' writings a totality, a congruity of individuals, who share together the burdens of society and the power to govern, indeed to operate state apparatuses, as Sieyès offers '… a theory of the complete nation as an embodiment of utilitarian or commercial sociability operating through the reciprocities of the division of labour'. 54 Here is where
Rousseau's idea of the will reappears, although in a very different schemata following the logics of majority rule and division of labour. 55 To Sieyès, the people embody the common will, which cannot be appropriated other than in an equal approach to individual wills; each person has one will and hence one vote. Therefore, the power of governance cannot be in the hands of a few holding certain honours and privileges, but must be in the hands of the majority: '[r]easoned argument is pointless if for a 13 single moment one abandons the self-evident principle that the common will is the opinion of the majority, not the minority'. 56 The conceptualisation by Sieyès of the nation as a totality entails the notion of 'constituent power', that is, the legitimacy of the Third Estate to freely govern its business and thus reject the legitimacy claims of both the aristocracy and the king. proportions, and the same rules. 59 The constituent power embedded in the idea of the nation à la Sieyès and his theory of representation is often taken as one of Sieyès' innovations or contributions to modern political thought. 60 My point, however, is that Sieyès' theory of the nation and national democratic representation is not only about juridical power/legitimacy but that it also entails a fantasmatic function since what he offers is not merely a narrative of constituent power and the legitimacy of the Third Estate, but why the Third Estate
is not yet fully congruent and in control of its fate, namely because of the nobility which claims to be the nation but are 'simply a word'. 61 This further illustrates the added-value of the category of fantasy, for what Sieyès ushers with his theory of the nation is an endless battle against obstacles to the legitimate and promised congruent telos. Sieyès's discourse is thus not only a theory of legitimacy/constituent power but a modality of congruency that entails its own failure, the explanation for why the nation is not yet fully congruent with the state. The 'biopolitical fracture' at the heart of the concept of the people, which 'has no single and compact referent', is thus both the drive and inevitable result of this fantasy of congruency. 62 
Sieyès' Third Estate as a New Subject for Analysis
What Sieyès defines as the nation is not a romantic mythological subject, as German romanticists would have it, nor is it a socio-political model designed to liberate people from a 'war of all against all'. 63 Rather, what emerges here is a new category -the 'congruent society' -which is imbued with the right to administer and rule 'its' juridical space. This is not only the idea of the nation as a common will, but most importantly that the 'nation' and the 'state' ought to be aligned, but only if the nation is 'authentic' and complete onto itself. To Sieyès, this logic of congruency follows three necessary stages, all relying on the idea of the 'common will' and the necessity of a unified nation. 64 The first stage is an association of individual wills, that is, a substantial group of people who wish to unite and in doing so they already form a nation. In the second stage, the individuals seeking to unite discuss their future sociopolitical arrangement, that is to say '... they confer with one another and agree upon public needs and how to meet them. Here it can be seen that power belongs to the public'. 65 In the third stage they produce a 'government by proxy', that is, a representative body that will be entrusted with the necessary power so as to execute the common will. 66 The establishment of a government of representatives is unavoidable, for Sieyès, because a nation, being an association of numerous people, cannot fully and directly engage with the public services needed to satisfy the common will.
Sieyès' logic prescribes a new subject/object of analysis for knowledge production and juridico-political administration that is not predicated on a state organised according to privilege or a social contract between the people and the state.
The latter point is key because Sieyès insists that the state and its various branches of governance are a manifestation of the people's will, the common will, and thus the notion of a social contract is one that is premised on a common bond amongst individuals, and not between them and their sovereign/state:
There is no other way to conceive of the social contract. It binds the associates to one another. To assume that there is a contract between a people and its government is a false and dangerous idea. A nation does not make a contract with those it mandates; it entrusts the exercise of its powers. 67 Nonetheless, the coupling of state and nation becomes in Sieyès' discourse a paradoxical necessity. 68 It is an impossible result, indeed a fantasmatic project, since it promises what can never be fully attained, jouissance, and thus continuously imagined. Firstly is the homogenisation of individuals themselves that through their will to unite form a nation. It is a unity of individuals in itself for the sake of a unity of wills. What then becomes necessary is the formal association of individuals into a juridico-political structure, i.e., the state. Therefore, to Sieyès, congruency stems from a homogenisation of wills that in its maturation produces the 'nation-state' couplet because the state entails a representative body that springs out of the body national as it holds the people's interests. 69 Its main language and operation are manifested through the law, and the law becomes the product of a unity of individuals and the congruency of the 'people' with its political system bounded by territorial demarcation. 'The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself'.
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Here we can see how the relationship between identity, law and authority/sovereignty is construed quite differently from early modern thought as
Sieyès fragments the state as modality of congruency and renders it possible only if it is the manifestation of the complete nation. 71 The 'nation', accordingly, emerges here as the discursive space, rather than the 'state' in early-modern thought, and its relationship with 'law' is homologous, that is, the law is not solely a manifestation of the nation's will, but it is the nation's will. 72 The 'nation'/'people' is rendered intelligible by virtue of, first, being true and identical with itself, an authentic and complete unity and thus embodying the law. However, second and as I also show below, the nation is made possible by virtue of being not, or at least not necessarily, concomitant with the state. Consequently, the state is not naturally synonymous with the nation and, therefore, one should critique and challenge existing states and inquire whether the 'true' and complete nation is indeed in power and thus expressed in its own state as this is not pre-given. The normative ideal, as I explained earlier, is a congruency of state and nation -the nation being a unified collectivity and the state its tools of management and governance -but the reality, according to Sieyès, is that existing societies are not truly congruent precisely because the 'complete nation' is not manifested in the state.
The political discourse that emerges here, as Foucault explains, assumes a twin-relationship, albeit an ambiguous one, between the nation and the state, such that the nation cannot co-exist with other 'nations' in its midst, that is, other collectivities like the nobility. 73 The nation encompasses everything; it provides the services and goods needed in a society. 74 Therefore, the nation ought to be embedded in a state that speaks through law and is bounded by foundational laws, a constitution. 75 The state, however, is the organisation of the existing nation and thus the only right form of its expression. The discourse now is not only one of social contracts, sovereignty or 'separation of powers'; instead, it invokes the right of the nation that is already homogeneous in its entirety and thus aspires legitimately, according to Sieyès, to coincide with the state.
This further demonstrates the fantasmatic nature of Sieyès' Third Estate, that is, the socio-political and biopolitical fracture at the heart of the nation, which can never be eliminated for that will simply annul the all notion of the nation. This is because the nation, in Sieyès' discourse, exists both before and independently of the state and at the same requires through its constituent power to manifest itself in, and thus merge, with the state. The nation is not only a subject of juridical power (functionality/capability), 76 but a fantasmatic subject that continuously strives for congruency and at the same time entails its own impossibility.
This, to reiterate, further stipulates the discursive rupture taking place in late eighteenth century thought and specifically with Sieyès, since the old (early-modern) practices of sovereign power are now transformed into a fantasy of a monistic society, a society in an endless project and thus a constant war. 77 Sieyès and the French
Revolutionaries have stipulated the supposed completeness and homogeneity of the nation as the highest source of authority, but at the same time they have also begun '… a long struggle to create it'. 78 This moment is thus part of the '...emergence of ''us versus them'' discourses as a challenge to the traditional principle of sovereignty', 79 for now it is a 'race war', which means that 'true' completeness of society is constantly threatened by 'enemy race', who/which is the obstacle to the fantasy of the congruent society, indeed the Other blamed for the unfulfilled congruity. 80 18
The Discursive Practices of Teleology, Representation and the Fantasy of Congruency
Sieyès' logic is an inversion of Hobbes' notions of the 'people' and the 'state' where sovereignty is the people and thus the idea of the 'people' can only exist via the state (which constitutes the 'people' through the unification of individuals and through their subordination to one will). 81 Sieyès, accordingly, fragments Hobbes' state as the modality of congruency in early-modern thought and maintains that the idea of the 'people'/'nation' exists prior to the state and is not established through the stateunlike Hont's idea that both Sieyès and Hobbes offer a theory of 'indirect popular sovereignty'. 82 Whilst Hobbes' state legitimacy came from its past, that is, the transition from the so-called 'state of nature' to the sovereign head, Sieyès' Third Estate was prescribing for the future-to-come, but which can never become the present. This means that attempts to create congruency may have already taken place before Sieyès, but that it is with Sieyès that a fantasy of congruency is fully articulated, a fantasy that subscribes a plan for the future, rather than justifying the past-present. 83 Moreover, the state model of early-modernity as a congruent entity is challenged, as Sieyès asserts that the state cannot be one, a unity per se, and must therefore be a manifestation, indeed a juridical, social and political embodiment, of the nation (and not a contract between the people and their ruler/sovereign). 84 This is key, for it shows again that Sieyès' discourse is not so much about the 'nation-state' or the fusion of state and nation. This is because whilst Sieyès' formula does ascribe an important role for the state, it is nonetheless only constituted through a manifestation, an expression of an already existing and complete nation, the Third Estate. The subject/object that arises with Sieyès is, therefore, the fantasy of congruency, a totality that is conditioned by the expression of a complete nation in a state apparatus of 'its' own.
The discursive practices through which the ideal of the congruent society is established and constituted are those of teleology and representation. First, the state is not construed as the existing manifestation of a union of many, or a social contract;
rather, the state is now the goal of the nation. To Sieyès, the ideal state is the ultimate and complete manifestation of the nation which exists prior to the state. As such, and second, the state can and should only represent the 'real' nation. The knowledge system that emerges here is not the knowledge of state affairs as with cameralism (Kameralwissenschaft), but rather a knowledge system of society -the 'congruent society'. 85 The questions that society should then ask itself are not whether the state is secured or wealthy, or whether it pertains to the common-good; rather, society now asks itself: are we a 'real' and complete nation? Are we indeed a nation that manifests its 'completeness' in a state? This demonstrates that with Sieyès, the fantasmatic function of the Third Estate is two-fold. The nation and the state are indeed in an endless relationship, that is, '… between the nation's statist potential and the actual totality of the state'. 86 But society must now also interrogate its alleged 'completeness' and totality. Is the nation indeed congruent onto itself and whether, once we have established national congruency, is it congruent with the state?
What is constituted here is the subject/object of the incomplete society that now structures its internal/external relations and knows itself via the fantasy of congruency. Jens Bartelson is thus correct in arguing that Sieyès' discourse is circular because '... the concept of a nation state comes to express nothing more than a vaguely tautological relationship between two entities which are merely numerically 20 distinct from each other'. 87 By this, Bartelson means that with Sieyès the nation concept is both '… the ultimate source of all authority' but also the desired objective of the revolution, which is to exclude other orders from within the nation (e.g., clergy, nobility) and manifest the nation within 'its' state. 88 In other words, the 'nation' presupposes the state but nonetheless requires to be aligned with the state, which in turn constitutes the idea of the nation. 89 But is not this state-to-nation tautology that which indeed produces the fantasy of congruency? It is a fantasmatic project, I suggest, by virtue of being an endless process; a constant apparatus of becoming that is never satisfied and cannot. The 'tautological' logic is thus what allows 'society' to know itself not only through the historicization and temporalization of its identity (as well as the construction of narratives and social imaginaries); 90 rather, society knows itself also through constant efforts at achieving the ideal of congruency, which can never be truly attained and yet must always be envisioned. The fantasy of societal congruency thus prescribes a utopian ultima ratio, the promise of jouissance, but at the same time introduces a prohibition on obtaining congruity, an explanation for why congruity is not yet achieved, either because we are not a complete nation and/or because we do not fully express our will in a state of our own.
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Back to the Present and Avenues for Future Research
In this paper I suggested to re-read Sieyès' text and to revisit the 'nation-state'
problématique. I argued that late eighteenth century thought does not produce the socalled 'nation-state' model, a fusion of the old modality of state sovereignty with that of popular sovereignty. My argument was that since the late eighteenth century the key subject/object that emerges is not solely the 'nation-state', but an ideal of congruency, a congruency of population, authority and space whether it is structured 21 around the state, nation or society markers or any other sign that pertains to an imagined collectivity. This ideal of congruency, I argued, can be read as fantasy, that is, a narrative that supports the contingency of social life and the incompleteness of 'our' society and how this is the result of an obstacle, an Other, who had stolen our enjoyment, the key to our promised future of congruency and fulfilment. Such fantasies of congruency, I suggested, cannot be realised for they will simply reveal the void of, and in, our imagined collectivity. Fantasy, accordingly, must continuously reproduce and re-invoke its becoming through affective technologies, offering an explanation for why 'we' are not yet congruent but at same time keeping us from fully eliminating the obstacle, the Other, for that will simply result in trauma. 92 Revisiting the 'nation-state' problématique through Sieyès can assist us in reassessing the historical changes in the notion of the nation and the state, thus further exploring genealogically the continuities and changes in the production of congruency as well as Sieyès' effects on post-revolutionary discourses and practices. 93 The creation of the citizen-subject in 1789 and the oft-cited distinction between civicbased and ethnic-based forms of nationalism, or between the "'demos' of citizens" and the "'ethnos' of fellow countrymen' is a point to consider. 94 In Sieyès' discourse of congruency the authenticity and comprehensiveness of the nation is juxtaposed to the clergy and the nobility, which thus constitute in those days the Other, the obstacle to achieving full French congruency. A fantasy of congruency that has come to be based on the ideals of citizenry, the republic and the rejection of class-based privilege.
Nonetheless, to German romanticists like Johann Gottlieb Fichte the fantasy of congruency is achieved organically through the body of the Volk. Congruency is thus understood as a natural and primordial unity between the individual, its habitat (e.g., nature, way of life, livelihood, and historical narratives) and the community, an indivisible and 'authentic' totality as the ultimate source of legitimacy. 95 This is the Volksnation modality of congruency '… assuming that the demos of citizens, in order to stabilize itself, must be rooted in the ethnos of fellow countrymen'. 96 The criterion for national membership can thus be differentiated between a primordial, albeit a constructed one, reading of the nation and nationalism and a citizenry and civic-based form of polity making. An issue that still plays a key role in nationality laws and types of regimes. 97 And yet, as some have already pointed out, such distinctions create a false dichotomy between civic and hence 'good' nationalism and an ethnic and hence 'bad' nationalism, as it also masks the problematic past of contemporary civic-based countries in the so-called 'new world', which entails the elimination of native populations. 98 It also obscures the exclusionary practices of perceived republics in which the non-citizen can be marginalized in the same fashion as the non-ethnic. 99 Therefore and whilst this distinction is relevant to our understanding of the development of the notion of the nation, we can see how in both (ideal-type) cases the apparatus of exclusion takes place, that is, how it is the impossible ideal of the complete society that renders the various articulations of nationalism and the 'nationstate' palpable. Equipped with this reading of the 'nation-state' problématique we can thus further look into the various articulation of the nation, the state and congruency in modern thought and practice. We can thus explore state and nation congruency in, for instance, Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History in which congruency gives rise to civilizational grandeur albeit only temporally. 100 We can also engage with the linking of national congruency to democracy and freedom as expressed in the works of John Stuart Mill, or Alexis de Tocqueville's writings on the congruency of New-England towns as a prerequisite to free and equal society. 101 We may further interrogate the ambiguous system of nationhood and the protection of 23 minorities as ushered during the 1920s under the League of Nations. 102 Or, as I have demonstrated in the introduction, interrogate the production of congruency in contemporary models of multiculturalism and communitarianism.
I would argue that such a genealogical enquiry is important for it will demonstrate the pervasiveness of the fantasy of congruency despite it being practiced in myriad ways throughout modern history. In other words, it will show that despite various readings of the nation and nationalism, the impossibility of congruency is at the heart of modern socio-political life. The need to exclude and articulate a certain
Other, an obstacle, is thus key to the fantasmatic project of congruency, be it the nonethnic Other, the foreigner or the non-citizen. Exposing the production of congruency and the myriad ways in which the process of exclusion take place, the processes of Othering, will have ethico-political implications for the ways in which we interrogate the socio-political, including democratic theory and questions of legitimacy, as well as the problematic relations between nationalism and liberalism. 103 It is of course beyond the scope of this paper to fully explore these avenues, but some tentative ideas can be drawn. Firstly and as I have argued in this paper, the modern constant preoccupation with congruency means that as with Sieyès the problem doesn't rest with the taken-for-granted ideas of the state and nationalism, what many argued against and defined as 'state-centrism', 'statism' and 'methodological nationalism'.
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It is actually the opposite, the incompleteness of the state, the nation and society. The unfulfilled promise of 'our' congruity that projects its failure onto the Other, the obstacle, and thus onto a future that must always be in the process of becoming and never realised. This means that critiquing traditional approaches throughout the social sciences as being statist and nationally-biased has somewhat missed the point, because the entire modern project around the nation, the state and society is precisely how these are not yet congruent, how they are not yet secured and complete in themselves. Social divisions, cultural clashes, crime and immigration, insecurity and the threat of (nuclear) war and so on are testament to the ways mainstream approaches in sociology, politics and international relations didn't really take the nation, the state and/or society as given; rather, it shows how these various tropes pertaining to the ideal of congruent collectivity were constantly constructed around and through the Other, who/which is responsible for the impossibility of congruency.
Secondly, reading Sieyès and modernity through the prism of congruency also means that we should be careful not to simply naturalise and normalise contemporary modalities of congruency as post-national, multicultural and racially heterogeneous.
These modalities may seem to reject the practices of national-chauvinism, racism and national xenophobia, 105 but they still subscribe to the fantasy of congruity albeit now operationalised around the markers of heterogeneity and 'unity in diversity'. 106 For us to engage critically with the implications of the fantasy of congruency we might move beyond, and thus collapse, the binary distinctions, between 'organic' and 'civic' nationalism, 'patriotism' and 'nationalism' or between the 'nation-state' and the 'state-nation'. 107 This will reveal how the ideal of congruency is still pervasive and why it requires more critical and reflexive thinking.
